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Mark Galeotti provides an account of the impact of the Afghan war on the Soviet Union 
that focuses on the experience of the soldiers sent to do their "internationalist duty." He 
covers an ambitious range of topics from how the Soviet leadership decided on a military 
intervention to the conditions faced by their troops, to the evolving impact of the war on 
Soviet politics, and to the personal, social and political consequences of the reintegration 
of some 750,000 veterans into Soviet life. Soviet conduct of the war and its impact on 
Afghanistan are essentially ignored, the author's intent being to factor the war's 
significance within the process that brought about the demise of the Soviet Union.  
Given the scope of the subject and the short format employed  the text covers 233 pages  
this work is probably best approached as an introduction to a vast and complicated 
historical process that will inevitably generate a large literature. It raises many critical 
questions and in several instances it provides shrewd and provocative answers. However, 
much of the argumentation is limited by the lack of sources and a tendency to argue most 
of the issues on the basis of impression and opinion. The format is constricted by an 
apparently limited effort to convert a doctoral thesis into a finished study. This is 
especially evident in the assertion that the Soviet military gained much practical and 
doctrinal knowledge from the Afghan experience. This assessment might have been 
tenable at the end of 1992 where the text stops, but as published in 1995 it fails to deal 
with important developments, especially in Russian politics and the further decline of the 
Russian army.  
Nevertheless, many of the substantive issues that Galeotti confronts are less affected by 
the absence of material from 1993 and 1994. The themes given close attention include the 
Soviet leadership's failure to create a plan for winning the war nor a strategy (until 
Gorbachev) for getting out of it. He argues that the Afghan war was a minor factor in the 
ultimate dismemberment of the Soviet Union, but that it was a highly visible symptom of 
the political and moral decay of the Brezhnevian era and that great popular resentment 
and disillusionment over the war was stimulated by the disinformation and censorship 
practised by the government. Moreover, it unintentionally generated a mythology that 
magnified the costs of the war, thereby contributing to its own political disintegration. He 
also develops the point that while a considerable number of Afgansty (Soviet veterans of 
the Afghan war) came later to play significant political and military roles in the Russian 
Federation, little was done to honor, succor or support the veterans as a whole. Galeotti 
argues persuasively that the exposure of Soviet cupidity and callousness toward its own 
soldiers greatly fuelled the glasnost process which exposed a long roster (as far back as 
the Spanish Civil War) of hidden foreign adventures that had cost Russian lives and 
careers. Generally, the deeper he probes into the consequences for the Soviet people, the 
more telling the points of interest he makes.  
His attempts to connect the causation and character of the war to its consequences for the 
Soviet Union are less convincing. He points out correctly that the Soviet leadership had 
expected their support would enable the Afghan communists to defeat quickly the 
scattered resistance that then existed in 1980. Instead, the Soviets were compelled to 
create a counterinsurgency project virtually from scratch, which brought their forces into 
direct and bloody combat. In the process they learned a great deal about anti-guerrilla 
warfare, but it cost them dearly in political unrest at home. Ironically and tragically the 
great majority of the international community which condemned the invasion shared the 
Kremlin's belief that the Afghan resistance would be quickly overcome. It took 
supporters of the resistance four years  the length of World War I  to provide effective 
counter-support to the Afghan mujahidin.  
The decision not to focus on the Afghan side of the conflict seriously limits Galeotti's 
attempts to explain Soviet behavior and expectations. Nothing is said about the 25 years 
of the Soviet Union's political, economic or military penetration of Afghanistan. The 
communist coup in 1978 is presented as a sudden event that caught the Soviet leadership 
by surprise. This overlooks the events leading up to the coup, especially the Soviet 
intervention in 1977 to end the festering conflict between the Khalq and Parcham wings 
of the Afghan communist party (PDPA). At that time Moscow was already alarmed at 
President Daud's purges of Parchamis from his cabinet and his strenuous effort to 
reorient foreign relations away from dependence on the Soviet Union. The coup may 
have been a totally Afghan event, carried out by the faction least favored by Moscow, but 
its proteges had good reason to believe Moscow would back them. Thus, to argue that the 
Soviets were left with a dilemma when Afghan resistance exploded against a vicious and 
blundering government, is to ignore the process that led to the decision to invade. The 
politburo may have had a number of salient reasons to choose intervention  Galeotti 
describes them clearly  but the underlying fact was that a failure to come to the rescue of 
a crumbling government fostered by the Soviet Union would have gone against the grain 
of Soviet behavior in the late 1970s. It was already deeply involved in penetration and 
intervention across Africa and in the Middle East by that time. It was its stumbling into 
Afghanistan that eventually forced the Soviet leadership to realize the danger of 
overextending the forward policy in Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen.  
Galeotti raises a significant point regarding the current Russian fear of the emergence of 
Islamist militancy or so-called fundamentalism in the Middle East and the new Central 
Asian republics. No concern was evident in the initial justifications offered for the 
invasion of Afghanistan, and instructions given the senior officers who carried it out did 
not include concern over a religious backlash. That problem and the anxiety that stems 
from it emerged in the course of the war.  
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